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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ON THE ICC 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998, and 
it became operational in 2002. 1 The ICC was established during a time 
period of significant movement in the field of international criminal law: 
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals were established in 1993 and 1994 
respectively, through Security Council resolutions, and the creation of 
a permanent international criminal court was viewed as complementary 
to the existing ad hoc accountability mechanisms. 2 The creation of 
the ICC was followed by the establishment of further ad hoc tribunals, 
such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers 
m the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 3 
* The Charles R. Emrick Jr. Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would like to thank 
participants of the Frederick K. Cox Center, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law conference on "Atrocity Prevention: The Role 
of International Law and Justice" for the opportunity to present a version 
of these remarks. 
1 See Mark Tran, Background: International Criminal Court, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/international­
criminal-court [https:/ /perma.cc/6LPM-F226]. For a detailed history 
about the ICC's establishment, see About the Court, COALITION FOR THE 
INT'L CRIM. CT., http:/ /iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory 
[https:/ /perma.cc/SDS8-X5KF]. 
2. For a discussion of the ICTY's and the ICTR's impact on the ICC, see 
Stuart Ford, The Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the International 
Criminal Court, in THE LEGACY OF Ao Hoc TRIBUNALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 307 09 (Milena Sterio & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2019). 
3. Id. at 311 12. 
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Thus, the ICC's birth can be situated within a period of activism in 
international criminal law, resulting in the creation of new 
accountability mechanisms focused on the prevention and punishment 
of atrocity crimes. 
The ICC was originally viewed as an enormous success for the field 
of international criminal law, and for the proposition that those who 
commit atrocity crimes should face individual criminal responsibility. 
"The court's mere existence has . . . served as a catalyst for 
accountability. "4 The initial enthusiasm for the court has significantly 
waned over the past two decades, in light of the court's weak record of 
convictions, the ongoing turmoil among the court's judges, as well as 
the court's contentious relationship with some of the world's powers, 
including the United States. 5 At the 17th Assembly of States Parties, 
the United Kingdom publicly criticized the court for its alleged failure 
to meet expectations set at the Rome Statute negotiations in 1998. 6 
According to the United Kingdom's statement at the ASP, "[W]e 
cannot bury our heads in the sand and pretend everything is fine when 
it isn't. The statistics are sobering. After [nearly] 20 years, and 1.5 
billion Euros spent we have only three core crime convictions. "7 
The following section will describe some of the most significant 
challenges that the ICC is currently facing, in order to assess how 
serious the court's current struggles are in light of its core mission of 
ending impunity. 
II. ICC AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 
The ICC is currently facing significant challenges which may put 
the court's legitimacy into question. These challenges include a weak 
record of prosecutions, discord among the court's judges, and a difficult 
relationship with the world's great powers, such as Russia and the 
United States. 
First, the ICC has been in existence for seventeen years; since its 
inception, the court has successfully convicted only eight defendants. 8 
4. 	 James A. Goldston, Don't Give Up on the ICC, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 
8, 2019), https: / /foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/08/dont-give-up-on-the-icc­
hague-war-crimes/ [https:/ /perma.cc/PHS4-8XGP]. 
5. 	 See generally id. 
6. 	 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK Statement to ICC Assembly of 
States Parties JJ'h Session, UK.GOV (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-statement-to-icc­
assembly-of-states-parties-17th-session [https:/ /perma.cc/QM7T-AL72]. 
7. 	 Id. 
8. 	 Douglas Guilfoyle, Part I This is not Fine: The International Criminal 
Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK (Mar. 21, 2019), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal­
468 
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2020) 
The International Criminal Court 
Out of the eight convictions, one has been overturned on appeal 
(Bemba), one resulted from a guilty plea (Al Mahdi), and four resulted 
from Article 70 administration of justice offenses. 9 The latter four 
offenses all arise out of the Central African Republic investigation and 
involve light sentences of 6 months to 3 years. 10 The remaining 
convictions for core crimes include Katanga (DRC), who was sentenced 
to 12 years but was ultimately transferred back to DRC custody with 
"sentence served" after only 8 years; Lubanga (DRC), who was 
sentenced to 14 years, and Al Mahdi (Mali), who pled guilty and was 
sentenced to 9 years. 11 Most recently, the ICC Trial Chamber convicted 
an additional defendant, Ntaganda. 12 Of several charges of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes; as of today, this defendant has not 
been sentenced but it is safe to assume that the imposed sentence will 
be serious, in light of the gravity of crimes for which Ntaganda was 
convicted. 13 
It would be imprudent to criticize the court for not convicting all 
defendants - all courts are supposed to respect defense rights, to operate 
on the presumption of innocence for all defendants, and it is rare for 
any court to have a 100 percent conviction rate. However, it is possible 
to criticize the court's prosecutor for initiating so few prosecutions and 
for presenting weak cases. In the Gbagbo case in particular, which 
resulted in an acquittal, the Trial Chamber lambasted the Office of the 
Prosecutor ("OTP" or "Prosecutor") for having presented such a 
disorganized and weak case. 14 In Gbagbo, the prosecutor struggled from 
the beginning. 15 At the confirmation of charges stage, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber criticized the prosecutor for attempting to build its case of 
crimes against humanity based on hearsay evidence from NGO reports 
and press articles. 16 The Pre-Trial Chamber gave the prosecutor five 
extra months to collect additional evidence which would withstand 
court-in-trouble [https://perma.cc/6YAY-QVMD] [hereinafter Guilfoyle, 
This is not Fine Part 1]. 
9. 	 Id. 
10. 	 Id. 
11. 	 Id. 
12. 	 See Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, , 1203 
(July 8, 2019). 
13. 	 Id. 
14. 	 Thijs Bouwknegt, Gbagbo An Acquittal Foretold, JUSTICEINFO.NET 
(Jan. 31, 2019), https:/ /www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/40156­
gbagbo-an-acquittal-foretold.html [https: / / perma.cc/NV6Q-K6W7]. 
15. 	 Id. 
16. 	 Id. 
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scrutiny and result in the confirmation of charges against Gbagbo. 17 
During Gbagbo's trial, the prosecution called multiple witnesses and 
presented thousands of pages of documents, but was unable to link 
Gbagbo to the violence that took place in Cote d'lvoire. 18 At the close 
of trial, which took several years, the trial chamber asked the prosecutor 
to submit an additional brief which would explain and better organize 
all of the evidence which the OTP had submitted during trial. 19 And 
on January 15, 2019, the Trial Chamber acquitted Gbagbo, after it 
granted a no case to answer motion at the end of the prosecution's 
case. 20 The Trial Chamber was exceptionally critical of the 
prosecution. 21 Judges criticized the prosecutor for her poor handling of 
the physical evidence, her reliance on hearsay testimony, and her 
distorted evidence gathering. 22 In addition, Trial Chamber judges were 
critical of the prosecutor's overly complex case theory; Judge Henderson 
observed that "[t]he prosecutor's narrative is largely internally coherent 
and prima facie plausible," and that she lacked "almost any direct 
evidence for her version of events" and thus "advanced an elaborate 
and multi-faceted evidentiary argument that is built almost entirely 
upon circumstantial evidence. "23 And Judge Tarfusser referred to the 
prosecutor's approach as "a vortex of circularity, self-reference and 
repetition that has not made the Chamber's task any easier. "24 Trial 
Chamber judges also criticized the prosecutor for her filings, poor 
courtroom technique and management of the courtroom time. 25 The 
Gbagbo prosecution has been referred to as a "fiasco" by former ICC 
judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert. 26 As Douglas Guilfoyle has noted, 
"the circumstances of the acquittal would appear a stinging rebuke. "27 
Moreover, it may be argued that a weak court delivering so few 
convictions has fallen short of its goals of fighting impunity and 
17. 	 Id. 
18. 	 Id. 
19. 	 Id. 
20. 	 Bouwknegt, supra note 14. 
21. 	 Douglas Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases: Lessons for the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court (Part II), EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 29, 2019), 
http://www.ej il talk.org/a-tale-of-two-cases-lessons-for- the-prosecutor-of­
the-international-criminal-court-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/7MAH­
5X6M] [hereinafter Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases Part Ilj. 
22. 	 Id. 
23. 	 Id. 
24. 	 Id. 
25. 	 Id. 
26. 	 Bouwknegt, supra note 14. 
27. 	 Douglas Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases Part II, supra note 21. 
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deterring the commission of atrocity crimes. "However, to the extent 
that the Court is meant to serve expressivist goals, fight impunity, or 
deter atrocity - it must present some credible threat to those who 
should fear accountability. It is often argued that the simple possibility 
of ICC accountability may deter atrocity that the existence of 
institutions may change behaviour. "28 
In addition to the above, several of the prosecutor's investigations 
and prosecutions have been unsuccessful. Gbagbo, whose case is 
mentioned directly above, as well as his aid were both acquitted at trial; 
the Kenyan cases involving Kenyatta and Ruto fell apart before trial, 
and the opening of the Afghanistan investigation was recently rejected 
by one of the court's pretrial chambers. 29 As Jim Goldston has noted, 
"something is wrong when a court created to "put an end to impunity" 
for "the most serious crimes," that deals with a handful of cases at a 
cost well in excess of $150 million per year, produces more acquittals 
and dismissals of charges than convictions. "30 
Second, the ICC's judges have displayed a level of discord among 
themselves, have been inconsistent in their application of substantive 
law, and some judges have been publicly embroiled in a salary dispute. 31 
All of these issues may contribute to a negative perception of the court 
as a failed institution. It appears that ICC judges do not get along. 32 
According to Guilfoyle, "there are very worrying signs of a breakdown 
in collegiality among the ICC judges which is damaging both the formal 
coherence of court decisions and its wider legitimacy. "33 Recently, such 
discord has escalated to a higher level when Judge Ibanez Carranza 
dissented from a decision assigning a different judge to preside over an 
appeal (Judge Ibanez Carranza complained that she had never been 
28. 	 Guilfoyle, This is not Fine Part I, supra note 8. 
29. 	 Dionne Searcey & Palko Karasz, Laurent Gbagbo, Former Ivory Coast 
Leader, Acquitted of Crimes Against Humanity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2019), https: / /www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15 /world/africa/laurent­
gbagbo-ivory-coast-icc.html [https:/ /perma.cc/WY2A-FN8G]; ICC 
Drops Uhuru Kenyatta Charges for Kenya Ethnic Violence, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019 
[https://perma.cc/2RDC-V4BU]; ICC Judges Reject Opening of an 
Investigation Regarding Afghanistan Situation, INT'L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1448 
[https:/ /perma.cc/P5UM-AG3N]. 
30. 	 Goldston, supra note 4. 
31. 	 Douglas Guilfoyle, Part III This is not Fine: The International Criminal 
Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https: / / www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-this-is-not-fine-the-international­
criminal-court-in-trouble/ [perma.cc/4FQD-7ZS7] [hereinafter Guilfoyle, 
This is not Fine Part IIlj. 
32. 	 Id. 
33. 	 Id. 
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assigned to preside over an appeal). 34 Her dissent was rebutted by a 
joint declaration by the ICC President and Judge Hofmanski, and 
Judge Ibanez Carranza then publicly characterized the issuance of such 
a joint declaration as a potential abuse of administrative functions. 35 
As Kevin Jon Heller observed, "you know things are bad at the Court 
when disagreements over presiding judge appointments is spilling out 
into the public." 36 
In addition to displaying public animosity toward one another, ICC 
judges have been divided in their application of the law, resulting in 
inconsistent judgements and contributing toward uncertainty in the 
definition and development of legal norms in the field of international 
criminal law. For example, in the Ruto and Sang "no case to answer" 
decision, the Trial Chamber announced its decision through a reference 
to separate opinions which gave different reasons for decision. 37 This 
"appears to signal a breakdown of the deliberative process if those who 
agreed on the outcome could not agree on a common set of reasons. "38 
Moreover, Judge van den Wyngaert wrote a scathing dissent from the 
Trial Chamber judgment in Katanga, to which Judges Cotte and Diarra 
responded in a joint separate opinion, and Judges Tafusser and 
Trendafilova dissented strongly from the Appeals Chamber judgment 
in Ngudjolo and Chui. 39 And Judges van den Wyngaert and Morrison,in 
the Bemba Appeal, accused their colleagues from the Trial Chamber of 
not attaching enough importance to the strict application of the burden 
34. 	 Kevin Jon Heller, Well, the Gbagbo "No Case to Answer" Appeal Should 
Be Interesting, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 22, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/01 /22/well-the-gbagbo-no-case-to-answer­
appeal-should-be-interesting/ [perma.cc/2UM7-C9DU]. 
35. 	 Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, ICC-02/11-01/15 
OA14, Joint Declaration of Judge Eboe-Osuji and Judge Hofmanski on 
the Procedure on the Election of Presiding Judges, , 3 (Jan. 22, 2019), 
available at https:/ /www.icc­
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_00213.PDF [perma.cc/HQE6-A8DQ]; 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Ble Goude, ICC-02/11-01/15­
1242-Anx3, Statement of Judge Ibanez Carranza with respect to the Joint 
Declaration of the President of the Court and the President of the Appeals 
Division on the Procedure on the Election of Presiding Judges, , 2 (Jan. 
24, 2019), available at https://www.icc­
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_00303.PDF [perma.cc/E367-MTN2]. 
36. 	 Heller, supra note 34. 
37. 	 See generally Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on 
Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ,, 147 150 (Apr. 5, 
2016). 
38. 	 Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases Part II, supra note 21. 
39. 	 Hemi Mistry, The Significance of Institutional Culture in Enhancing the 
Validity of International Criminal Tribunals, 17 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 17 
(2017). 
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and standard of proof and to the due process rights of the accused. 40 
While some of the judicial disagreement in terms of substantive law can 
be attributed to the fact that the court's judges come from different 
countries and legal traditions, it can also be observed that judges from 
other ad hoc tribunals (most notably the ICTY) also came from diverse 
backgrounds but were nonetheless able to come to an agreement 
regarding substantive law in a significant number of cases. 41 Moreover, 
it may also be argued that while some disagreement and dissent among 
judges is permissible and does not signal a lack of collegiality, the 
above-mentioned strongly worded dissents, where judges accuse one 
another of unfairness or of having acted ultra vires, does display a level 
of animosity which threatens to undermine the ICC's perceived 
legitimacy. Additionally, the lack of consensus over substantive law 
among ICC judges is damaging to the court because this disables the 
court from developing coherent jurisprudence on difficult or novel legal 
issues stemming from the Rome Statute. "The result is a mess for 
anyone attempting to discern what the applicable law on point is at the 
ICC.... "42 
In addition, some ICC judges have been involved in a pseudo-public 
dispute over their salaries. 43 While these judges may have valid claims 
regarding their compensation, this type of a dispute contributes to a 
largely negative perception of the court as an elite institution whose 
members are out of tune with reality. 
Third, the ICC has had a difficult relationship with the world's 
superpowers, including Russia, China, and the United States. 44 Russia 
and China have repeatedly vetoed draft Security Council resolutions 
which would have referred the Syrian situation to the ICC. 45 And 
because of increased polarization within the Security Council, Russia 
and China opposing the United States, the prospects of any future 
Security Council referrals are slim. 46 In addition, the ICC had a difficult 
40. 	 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Combo, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Anx2, 
Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard 
Morrison, , 4 (June 8, 2018), available at https://www.icc­
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2018_02989.PDF [/perma.cc/YS3H-8H3W]. 
41. 	 Id. 
42. 	 Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases Part II, supra note 21. 
43. 	 Janet Anderson, Money Matters at the ICC, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Dec. 14, 
2018), https:/ /www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/39771-money­
matters-at-the-icc.html [perma.cc/27UM-795J]. 
44. 	 Goldston, supra note 4. 
45. 	 See Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY, 
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick [perma.cc/N2XN-HVDY]. 
46. 	 See CLAUS KREB, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE ICC APPEALS 
CHAMBER'S JUDGMENT OF 6 MAY 2019 IN THE JORDAN REFERRAL RE AL­
BASHIR APPEAL 21 (2019) (ebook). 
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relationship with the United States during the George W. Bush 
administration; during this time, the United States passed the 
American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002, which was intended 
to prohibit American cooperation with the ICC. 47 Moreover, the United 
States concluded multiple-bilateral agreements with different countries, 
in order to ensure the latter would not extradite US nationals found 
within such countries to the court. 48 These agreements effectively 
precluded signatory countries from cooperating with the ICC in matters 
of extradition, and have weakened the court's ability to execute arrest 
warrants against some indicted individuals. 49 More recently, the Trump 
Administration has displayed overt hostility toward the court. John 
Bolton, who at the time served as National Security Advisor, lambasted 
the court and accused it of having "no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, no 
authority." 50 Bolton announced that the United States would revoke 
visas for the ICC personnel, and even threatened that such personnel 
could be arrested if present in the United States. 51 Although John 
Bolton no longer serves in the Trump Administration, it is unclear that 
the administration's view toward the court will improve. 52 In addition 
to the world's superpowers, other countries have not been cooperative 
with the ICC. In 2009 and 2010, the court issued two arrest warrants 
for Al-Bashir, who at the time served as President of Sudan. 53 Since 
then, Al-Bashir has been able to travel to multiple other countries, 
including some ICC member states, all of which failed to arrest him 
47. 	 U.S.: 'Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 
3, 2002), https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act­
becomes-law [perma.cc/K2LC-ZGSL]. 
48. 	 Q 8 A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https: / / www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15 / qa-international-criminal-court­
and-united-states#7 [perma.cc/K4LV-BMDNJ. 
49. 	 See id. 
50. 	 Id. 
51. 	 Rebecca Gordon, Why Are We Above International Law?, THE NATION 
(Mar. 26, 2019), https:/ /www.thenation.com/article/archive/rebecca­
gordon-international-criminal-court-john-bolton/ [perma.cc / 7XDS­
M8SY]. 
52. 	 Philip Ewing, Trump Fires John Bolton in Final Break After Months Of 
Internal Policy Division, NPR (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https: / /www.npr.org/2019/09/10/724363700/trump-fires-john-bolton-in­
final-break-after-months-of-policy-di visions [perma. cc/C8VW-LFYV] . 
53. 	 Tom White, States 'Failing to Seize Sudan's Dictator Despite Genocide 
Charge,' THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/oct/21/omar­
bashir-travels-world-despite-war-crime-arrest-warrant [perma.cc/5SGM­
YP2F]. 
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and to deliver him to The Hague. 54 At the 2017 Assembly of States 
Parties, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda gave a briefing to the Security 
Council; several Security Council states' representatives, following the 
briefing, continued to assert the proposition that Al Bashir had 
immunity from the court's jurisdiction, thus displaying their continued 
lack of cooperation with the court. 55 
In sum, as of today, the ICC faces serious challenges which the 
court will need to address in order to re-position itself as a fundamental 
accountability-providing mechanism in international criminal justice. 
The section below will suggest how the ICC should proceed going 
forward, so that the court can face a brighter future. 
Ill. FUTURE OF THE ICC 
First, the ICC 's prosecutor should continue to build cases so that 
she can ultimately prosecute more individuals. As opposed to 
prosecuting presidents and prime ministers, the ICC's prosecutor could 
focus on lower level offenders, whose cases may be easier to put together 
and where the chances of conviction may be higher. The model for 
success here are the Lubanga case, which resulted in a conviction and a 
sentence of 14 years, and the most recent Ntaganda case, which resulted 
in a conviction on crimes against humanity and war crimes charges. 56 
According to Professor Guilfoyle, "recent developments largely serve to 
confirm the unpalatable lessons I drew earlier from Lubanga: a narrow 
case, run against a rebel leader on relatively few (or at least closely 
related) charges can succeed. This was the model of success in Ntaganda 
.... " 
57 In Ntaganda, a unified Trial Chamber issued a methodical 
judgment which affirmed that the OTP had presented a solid case. 58 
The Ntaganda case map provide the OTP with a roadmap for successful 
future prosecutions: a case built on detailed investigation, arising out 
of a single situation, involving a rebel leader, accused of a relatively 
54. 	 Id. (reporting that Al Bashir has been able to engage in 150 trips to 
countries such as China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and 
Kenya, many of which are members of the ICC). 
55. 	 U.N. S.C. 7963rd mtg. at 2, 7, 12, 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7963 (June 8, 
2017). 
56. 	 See Press Release, ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Sentenced to 14 Years of 
Imprisonment, ICC-CPl-20120710-PR824 (July 10, 2012), available at 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr824 
[perma.cc/VWX2-N4KU]; see generally Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC­
01/04-02/06, Decision (July 8, 2019), available at https://www.icc­
cpi.int/drc/ntaganda [perma.cc/X729-PXM9]. 
57. 	 Guilfoyle, A Tale of Two Cases Part II, supra note 21. 
58. 	 Id. 
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narrow set of charges. 59 In fact, a deep investigation into crimes 
committed by a lower level individual, and a successful conviction of 
the same individual could potentially lead toward the imposition of 
accountability on higher-level defendants from the same 
country/situation. The Yugoslavia tribunal in particular was successful 
in this approach: the ICTY's first defendant was Dusko Tadic, a 
relatively unknown lower-level leader of the Bosnian Serbs; the ICTY's 
last defendants were Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, civil and 
military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs. 60 It may be argued that the 
ICTY built a successful foundation by first prosecuting lower-level 
leaders before reaching for those at the top, and that the investigations, 
gathered evidence, and prosecutorial work accomplished during the 
prosecution of lower-level cases paved the way toward a successful 
prosecution of Karadzic and Mladic. The ICC could follow the ICTY's 
example and the prosecutor could start building cases against lower­
level defendants for existing situations, which may lead toward the 
indictment of leaders. 
Second, the ICC's prosecutor should construct a careful strategy 
regarding future case selection, which should include considerations 
such as the prospects of a successful conviction, the possibility that the 
chosen case and prosecution will lead toward more prosecutions of 
higher-level defendants, geographic diversity to ensure that defendants 
from all parts of the world are investigated and prosecuted, as well as 
any political concerns related to the opening of a new case. When 
prosecuting cases, the OTP should ensure that the prosecution is the 
result of a long and detailed investigation, based on better in-country 
expertise, and that the evidence at trial is presented in a logical and 
well-thought out manner. 
It should be noted that the OTP has already recognized the two 
above-mentioned concerns and has acknowledged the necessity to 
engage in more strategic case selection in its most recent Strategic Plan. 
In the Strategic Plan, the OTP acknowledged that it should "give 
increased consideration to the possibility of bringing cases to justice 
that are narrower in scope, insofar as they focus on key aspects of 
victimisation, particular incidents, areas, time periods, or a single 
accused," and that it should "consider bringing cases against notorious 
or mid-level perpetrators who are directly involved in the commission 
of crimes, to provide deeper and broader accountability and ... [to lay 
59. 	 Id. 
60. 	 See History, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the­
prosecutor/history [perma.cc/BS6R-HGQ9]. 
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foundations for] subsequent cases against higher-level accused." 61 
Moreover, according to the Strategic Plan, "The quality of the work is 
an essential element to effectively meet the Office's mandate and for 
the long-term legitimacy and credibility of the Office. If the Office needs 
to make a trade-off between the speed, the number of parallel 
investigations and the quality of the investigations, then it will 
prioritise the quality of its work. With the limited number of cases, it 
is essential to achieve a high rate of success in court if the Office is to 
succeed in fulfilling its mandate. "62 
If choosing cases which may be politically challenging, the OTP 
will need to ensure that the evidence presented is sufficiently strong to 
combat any political pressure, as well as to develop a communications 
and public relations strategy to combat criticism. As mentioned above, 
the OTP suffered a blow earlier this year when one of the court's pre­
trial chambers refused to authorize the continuation of the Afghanistan 
investigation. 63 When this investigation began, it was relatively easy 
to foresee that it would cause political backlash, and if OTP wishes to 
pursue such cases, it needs to be ready to present strong cases and to 
adequately handle any ensuing political pressure. 
Third, certain procedures may need to be revisited. In particular, 
the existence of Pre-Trial Chambers, which according to the current 
procedures need to confirm charges presented by the OTP, should be 
re-examined. Scholars have already advanced this argument: Douglas 
Guilfoyle, for example, has argued that "[m1any of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber functions could as easily be conducted by a Trial Chamber, 
and the confirmation of charges process substantially streamlined," 
because in light of the court's relatively few active cases, "the Pre-Trial 
Division... has come to seem a cumbersome and ineffective mechanism 
which is largely a source of delay." 64 Former ICC Judge Christine Van 
Den \!Vyngaert has also criticized the existence of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, and has referred to it as a "mistake in the legal architecture" 
because "instead of accelerating everything, it just slowed everything 
down." 65 
Fourth, ICC judges should work on forging consensus regarding 
substantive law. This may entail better communication and 
coordination among the judges, an increased sharing of expertise and 
61. 	 The Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2019-2021, INT'L CRIM. CT., 
20 (July 17, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20190726­
strategic-plan-eng.pdf [perma.cc/5YBE-XDDF]. 
62. 	 Id. at 16. 
63. 	 ICC: Judges Reject Afghanistan Investigation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Apr. 12, 2019), https:/ /www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/12/icc-judges­
rej ect-afghanistan-investigation [perma.cc/5Q6J-WRDJ] . 
64. 	 Guilfoyle, This is not Fine Part III, supra note 31. 
65. 	 Guilfoyle, This is not Fine Part I, supra note 8. 
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ideas, and an awareness from all the judges about the importance of 
delivering consistent and uniform decisions. 
Finally, the ICC needs to foster better cooperation from its member 
states, as well as from other states throughout the world. The court 
cannot succeed if it surrounded by hostile states, as all of its 
investigations depend on the host country's willingness to cooperate 
with the court. As Douglas Guilfoyle has noted, "international criminal 
tribunals need powerful patrons to operate successfully" 66 and the ICC's 
future success may depend on better support and cooperation from its 
constituents. Thus, it is crucial for the ICC to invest resources into 
building strong support among its member states, and throughout the 
world. 
The ICC is a fundamental institution in the field of international 
criminal justice. Its success is vital for this field, and its failure could 
constitute an enormous setback. As Jim Goldston recently wrote, 
"Perhaps the most compelling argument for investing in a more 
effective ICC is that letting it die would deliver a huge blow to the fight 
against impunity. Flawed as it is, the ICC remains a capstone of our 
centuries-long search for a world in which the law prevails over brute 
force. Giving up on it now would set back that struggle immeasurably 
and would be a grave disservice to the many courageous activists who 
have given their lives for the cause of fighting crimes against humanity 
and genocide. "67 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ICC has served as an agent of impunity since its inception in 
1998, and its fundamental role in the field of international criminal 
justice as a permanent accountability mechanism remains undisputed. 
The court is, however, facing significant challenges which may threaten 
its legitimacy. These challenges can be surmounted if the court is 
willing to take a hard look at its own procedures, prosecutorial 
practices, and judicial attitudes. The ICC's future may be bright if the 
court makes significant changes in the present. 
66. Id. 
67. Goldston, supra note 4. 
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